Female directors and managerial opportunism: Monitoring versus advisory female directors

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Zalata A. M., NTIM C., Choudhry T., Hassanein A., Elzahar H.

Leadership Quarterly, vol.30, no.5, 2019 (SSCI, Scopus) identifier identifier

  • Publication Type: Article / Article
  • Volume: 30 Issue: 5
  • Publication Date: 2019
  • Doi Number: 10.1016/j.leaqua.2019.101309
  • Journal Name: Leadership Quarterly
  • Journal Indexes: Social Sciences Citation Index (SSCI), Scopus
  • Keywords: Advisory versus monitoring directors, Earnings management, Economic versus social theories, Female directors, Gender differences
  • Open Archive Collection: Article
  • Azerbaijan State University of Economics (UNEC) Affiliated: Yes

Abstract

Going beyond the mere participation of female directors within boardrooms, we investigate which of the two major boards of directors' roles (advisory versus monitoring) is best played by female directors in order to make a difference to shareholders. More specifically, we investigate the impact that advisory and monitoring female directors have on managerial opportunism with a specific focus on earnings management. Using sample of US firms, we find evidence suggesting that female directors holding monitoring roles mitigate managerial opportunism, as measured by discretionary accruals. In contrast to the current argument that advisory directors in general are better able to sustain and improve earnings quality, we find no evidence that suggests that advisory female directors are significantly associated with lower managerial opportunism. Overall, the results remain robust after controlling for potential endogeneity problems, corporate governance, and external auditor quality.