Akademik Məlumat İdarəetmə Sistemi
in: Analysis of the Turkic World in the 30th Anniversary of Independence, Prof. Dr. Köksal ŞAHİN,Doç. Dr. Suat KOL, Editor, Sakarya University Publication No: 234, Sakarya, pp.228-248, 2023
Analyzing the main vectors of foreign policy of Azerbaijan, it should be noticed that the integral foreign policy task of modern Azerbaijan has become the protection of political and territorial unity, inextricably linked with the restoration of control over the occupied territory. Confirmation of this can be found in the National Security Concept of the Republic of Azerbaijan. Regarding the foreign policy of Azerbaijan, it is also essential to take into account its geopolitical position, that is, the fact that this state borders on major global and regional powers such as Russia, Iran and Türkiye. On the other hand, Azerbaijan is aware of its geostrategic significance since it is the only country used to transit Caspian hydrocarbon resources in European countries without the involvement of Russia and Iran in this process. This fact allows him to “play” on the regional ambitions of global and regional powers, on the contradictions between them and receive certain dividends from this. After the victory in 2020, Azerbaijan’s foreign policy is aimed at taking advantage of this military victory and its economic, legal and general advantages in the international political arena, which will completely end up the issue of Armenian separatism. At the same
time, several priority aspects should be particularly noted:1) Russian “peacekeepers” Although the concern of the condemners with accusations like “Russia will not leave here” in Azerbaijan is understandable, they “forget” that policy is not driven by desires but by what is presumable. The Azerbaijani government has acquired a balanced foreign policy and improved relations with Russia, significantly reducing the latter’s support for the separatists. This is manifested both in the liberation of approximately 75 percent of the occupied territories, in many issues related to the fate of the territories under the control of Russian peacekeepers, in considering the position of Azerbaijan, which is different from the previous situation, and in a significant increase in the possibilities of influence and pressure of the Azerbaijani side. Secondly, we can say that the fact that the official status of
peacekeepers in the region is not fully defined is in the interests of the Azerbaijani side. 2)The problem of the Zangezur corridor:First of all, we note that the issue of the Zangezur corridor was mentioned in the declaration of November 2020. This was reflected not at all by the will of Azerbaijan but as a result of the reconciliation of the geopolitical and geo-economic interests of the two regional powers - Türkiye and Russia. As the conflict with the Western world escalates, other markets and their logistical aspects are growing for
both Türkiye and Russia. This is extremely important for Armenia, which wants to get rid of the unprecedented dependence on Russia and the alms of its diaspora. For Azerbaijan, “engaged” with prospective and investment-requiring projects with liberation from the occupation of territories, the creation of a corridor passing through the territory of Armenia, occupying non-economic, but from a political point of view: with the mutual origin of the territorial integrity of each other; The opening of the Zangezur corridor is associated with
the demarcation and delimitation of borders, and the latter is associated with the mutual recognition of each other’s territorial integrity; 3) As the main problem in signing a peace treaty between Azerbaijan and Armenia will not be the status of Nagorno-Karabakh but the enclaves. This issue seems convoluted to the Armenian government from several points of view: I) The territorial ratio of the enclaves in favor of Azerbaijan is 100 km:40 km. It means that Armenia will still have to abandon the land (although this is absolutely correct
from the point of view of international law, it will be perceived by enslaved by political myths of Armenian society as a new retreat and defeat); II) Besides the size of the enclaves, their military-strategic location is also important. The Irevan-Tbilisi interstate highway, the main road to the Lori region of Armenia, the key highway connecting the north and south of Armenia, passes in close proximity to the territories of the enclaves. In the absence of legal and other arguments, Azerbaijan is required to make at least some concessions on the issue of statistical villages or exchange of territories. But what can be given to Azerbaijan instead of this goodwill? The fact that this question remains unanswered compels Armenia to switch to its old tactics - to hold up all processes as much as possible. At the moment, Azerbaijan is successfully continuing its foreign policy towards the realization of goals that serves national interests. Processes are moving faster in some areas, and slower in others, but they are moving in the direction Azerbaijan wants. It can be said with confidence that if there is no urgent crisis at the global level (WorldWar III, nuclear war, etc.) against the background of internal and external conditions and factors until 2025 (the end of the stay of
Russian peacekeepers here) there will be considerable progress made and success towards the achievement of the set goals.
Keywords: Caucasus Region, Foreign Policy of Azerbaijan, Karabakh War.