The Environmental Consequences of Local Government Competition: Evidence from 209 Chinese Cities

Shen Z., Zhang Y., Wu K., İRFAN M., Hao Y.

Computational Economics, vol.63, no.6, pp.2115-2137, 2024 (SCI-Expanded, SSCI, Scopus) identifier

  • Nəşrin Növü: Article / Article
  • Cild: 63 Say: 6
  • Nəşr tarixi: 2024
  • Doi nömrəsi: 10.1007/s10614-023-10396-1
  • jurnalın adı: Computational Economics
  • Jurnalın baxıldığı indekslər: Science Citation Index Expanded (SCI-EXPANDED), Social Sciences Citation Index (SSCI), Scopus, IBZ Online, International Bibliography of Social Sciences, ABI/INFORM, EconLit, INSPEC, zbMATH
  • Səhifə sayı: pp.2115-2137
  • Açar sözlər: Collaborative governance, Evolutionary game, Haze pollution, Spatial Durbin model, Two-region system
  • Açıq Arxiv Kolleksiyası: Məqalə
  • Adres: Bəli

Qısa məlumat

Widely harming the society and economy, the problem of haze pollution needs to be solved urgently. Local governments play an important role in the effective management of haze pollution. This paper first uses an evolutionary game model to analyze the mechanisms by which local governments choose different strategies to combat haze, and then extends the study to the micro level at the city level. Using panel data from 209 prefecture-level cities in mainland China from 2007 to 2016, a two-region spatial Durbin model is constructed to study the competitive patterns of local government haze pollution management. The results show that different from the “competition to the bottom” of provincial governments, there is a significant “imitation” behavior in the governance of haze pollution by local governments at the city level in China. In addition, a local government’s efforts to reduce haze pollution are easily influenced by neighboring administrative regions, especially those with low levels of control. The research results passed the robustness test. Finally, relevant policy implications are provided to help improve the regional cooperative management system of haze pollution in China.